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AMICUS BRIEF OF 
THOMAS G. FIELD, JR., PRO SE 
SUPPORTING IN PRINCIPLE, ON REHEARING 
THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND 
TRADEMARKS
l     John Duffy, Craig Nard and Tom Field's Amicus Brief to the Supreme 
Court. 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
96-1258 
(Serial No. 07/479,666) 
IN RE MARY E. ZURKO, THOMAS A. CASEY, JR., MORRIE GASSER, JUDITH S. 
HALL, CLIFFORD E. KAHN, ANDREW H. MASON, PAUL D. SAWYER, LESLIE R. 
KENDALL, and STEVEN P. LIPNER 
Appeal from a decision of 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences dated July 31, 1995. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
http://www.piercelaw.edu/TFIELD/Zurko.htm (1 of 12)7/19/2006 2:49:31 PM
Amicus Brief in Zurko
The Court has ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs 
addressed to the following issue: Should this court review Patent 
and Trademark Office fact-findings under the Administrative 
Procedure Act standard of review instead of the presently applied 
clearly erroneous standard?
In re Zurko, No. 96-1258 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 1997) 
Contents
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS CASE CONCERNS MUCH MORE THAN "SEMANTICS" 
II. "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" REVIEW OFFENDS A STATUTORY MANDATE 
   A. For over a century, the Supreme Court has regarded the PTO as an 
agency. 
   B. Congress has clearly mandated review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
      1. The APA clearly governs by default. 
      2. Further consideration of the PTO as an "agency". 
      3. Without legislative mandate, "clearly erroneous" review appears to 
be unique. 
      4. Standards extrinsic to the APA have not been impliedly ratified. 
      5. APA Standards have not been impliedly excluded. 
      6. The Office is not estopped to insist on APA standards. 
III. APA REVIEW REFLECTS SOUND POLICY 
   A. It provides access to the mainstream of administrative process. 
   B. APA review is not unduly deferential. 
IV. "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" ENCOURAGES APPEALS; "CAPRICIOUS, 
ARBITRARY..." AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY 
   A. "Clearly erroneous" is an uncertain benchmark. 
      1. Reversal rates. 
      2. Early CCPA standards would have discouraged appeals. 
      3. Moving to a less deferential standard. 
      4. Uncertainty encourages appeals. 
   B. "Capricious, arbitrary...." is typically applied in these circumstances. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
     To those unfamiliar with the long, often bitter, struggle over equally 
compelling needs to provide, on the one hand, innovators with an adequate 
opportunity to recoup risk capital and to avoid, on the other, erecting 
unwarranted barriers to competition, a dispute over the proper scope of review 
for Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent appeals will seem both trivial and 
arcane. This case involves more than semantics -- its resolution turns on the 
allocation of power among three, and arguably four, branches of government. 
This Court, itself, has a stake. 
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     The current scope of review in PTO patent appeals is both idiosyncratic and 
uncertain. "Clearly erroneous" appears to be uniquely applied to those and 
trademark appeals -- absent explicit statutory authority and in facial conflict 
with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It appears also to be, thus far, 
inconsistent with the scope of review for PTO fact finding that otherwise tends to 
closely track APA standards. 
           The scope of review in PTO patent appeals has varied widely. Review by 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in the 1930s was highly 
deferential. Yet, by the mid-1960s, that Court's approach had become 
sufficiently non-deferential to prompt experts appointed by the Johnson 
Administration to recommend "clearly erroneous" as the statutory scope of 
review. 
One key question is what does "clearly erroneous" mean? Is it sui generis, to be 
applied only to a subset of cases arising from the PTO, or does it incorporate the 
standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) [Rule 52(a)]? The former seems singularly 
unwarranted -- it would further isolate the Agency from otherwise relevant 
bodies of precedent. If the latter, as suggested in some panel decisions, a 1985 
amendment also deserves close attention. 
     Yet, these questions need not be addressed. Statutory provisions for PTO 
appeals do not set forth any scope of review. In such circumstances, the final 
section of the APA mandates that its standards be applied -- subject only to the 
condition that the PTO be an "agency". For at least a century, it has been so 
regarded by the Supreme Court. Hence, APA standards must be used as 
intended, i.e., to foster uniform treatment of citizens complaining of action by 
unelected federal officials. Failure of the PTO to complain, e.g., when in the 
1960s it was caught between the Scylla of Supreme Court criticism and the 
Charybdis of CCPA reversal cannot estop a later Administration from protesting 
a legislatively unwarranted scope of review. 
     Applying APA standards also reflects sound policy. Rules should reference 
the most relevant precedents. Substantive issues aside, APA cases are much 
more relevant than those applying Rule 52(a) only within the judicial branch. 
Most importantly, as recently reflected in a few Federal Circuit decisions, they 
illuminate the path toward a proper balance between executive and judicial 
authority. 
     Some may believe that adherence to either of two roughly equivalent, but 
more deferential, APA standards for all PTO fact finding will abdicate Federal 
Circuit responsibility as the primary judicial overseer of the patent system (or, 
presuming that the same standards should apply, as a major overseer of federal 
trademark registers). That need, and should, not be so. First, courts are 
obligated to "set aside agency action... found to be-- ... contrary to 
constitutional right...; in excess of statutory... authority...; [or] without 
observance of procedure required by law...." Second, they can refuse to uphold 
actions that lack adequate and well-reasoned support in the record. 
     Thus, the Federal Circuit is respectfully urged to abandon "clearly erroneous" 
as its scope of review in PTO patent appeals. With the possible exception of 
facts underlying patent validity determinations, APA standards should be applied 
across the board in PTO appeals. Alternatively, should this Court find some basis 
for concluding otherwise, Rule 52(a) should be explicitly referenced and as 
carefully considered as is warranted in reviewing district court decisions. 
ARGUMENT
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I.   THIS CASE CONCERNS MUCH MORE THAN "SEMANTICS" 
     The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO or Office) protests that "clearly 
erroneous" review in patent appeals does not accord its fact finding appropriate 
deference. In historical context its grievance seems small,[1] but it deserves 
close consideration. Resolution implicates the amount of respect any court 
should afford any executive entity, notwithstanding that it is complicated by this 
Court's, too, having unique status in the patent system and no small stake in 
the outcome. Indeed, and unfortunately, as in In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996), appellants may justly feel to be mere bystanders; id. at 1431-32. 
     This case is more complicated than it ought to be because, in pursuing a 
more deferential scope of review, the PTO has shifted position. Initially, as in 
Kemps, it maintained that the "arbitrary, capricious" standard was appropriate; 
now it seeks "substantial evidence" review. How different are those standards? 
     Then-Judge Scalia pointed out that differences are small: 
"We have noted on several occasions that the distinction between 
the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test is 
`largely semantic,'...." Assn. Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Bd. Governors, Federal Reserve System, 745 
F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984). (Emphasis added.)
     The choice between these standards is not as compelling as that between 
either of those and clearly erroneous. However, as discussed below, neither is it 
trivial. Differences between terms of art should never be dismissed. The authors 
of a leading administrative law casebook, coaching students toward an 
understanding of judicial review, state: "A feel for this evolving common law can 
be gained only by exposure to hundreds of cases, not a handful."[2] 
     If courts do not consistently reference the most relevant established 
benchmarks, understanding is unlikely regardless of the number of cases read. 
Were that not the case, this Court might be warranted in taking the next step 
and maintaining that distinctions between APA and "clearly erroneous" scopes of 
review are also largely semantic. In any event, that approach would be both 
inappropriate and contrary to strong authority. 
II.   "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" REVIEW OFFENDS A STATUTORY MANDATE 
     "Substantial evidence" is derived from standards used to review jury trials, e.
g., Data Processing, 745 F.2d 684, and therefore is closely related to the 6th 
and 7th Amendments. Were judges not suitably deferential to jury 
determinations of fact, the right to trial by jury of one's peers would be largely 
meaningless. To the extent that "arbitrary or capricious" is equivalent, review 
should be similarly deferential whether applied to fact or legal issues; see, e.g., 
Data Processing, 745 F.2d 683-4. This also seems true of "abuse of discretion" 
following the latter in 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A).[3] 
     In contrast with all of those, "clearly erroneous" is generally applied only to 
appeals from bench trials. Because these are not subject to 6th and 7th 
Amendment rights, reversal on issues of fact is much easier. Such review is 
currently unwarranted in the administrative context. 
     A.   For over a century, the Supreme Court has regarded the PTO as 
an agency. 
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     Consider the implications of the following passage:[4] 
     "But this is something more than a mere appeal. It is an 
application to the court to set aside the action of one of the 
executive departments of the government. The one charged with 
the administration of the patent system had finished its 
investigations and made its determination with respect to the 
question of priority of invention. .... A new proceeding is instituted 
in the courts -- a proceeding to set aside the conclusions reached 
by the administrative department.... .... It is a controversy 
between two individuals over a question of fact which has once 
been settled by a special tribunal, entrusted with full power in the 
premises. As such it might be well argued, were it not for the 
terms of this statute, that the decision of the Patent Office was a 
finality upon every matter of fact." Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 
124 (1894) (emphasis added).
     Also, consider the final paragraph from Advisory Committee notes 
accompanying a 1985 amendment to Rule 52(a): 
     "The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching 
appellate review of findings... based solely on documentary 
evidence is that the rationale of Rule 52(a) does not apply when the
[y]... rest on... an evaluation of documentary proof and the 
drawing of inferences from it, thus eliminating the need for any 
special deference.... These considerations are outweighed by the 
public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be 
promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the appellate 
tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. To permit courts of 
appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding function would 
tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes 
of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of 
some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial 
authority." (Emphasis added.)
     Rephrasing slightly, for this Court to share as actively in PTO decision 
making as "clearly erroneous" suggests is to undermine the Office's legitimacy 
in the eyes of applicants, multiply appeals and (beyond "needlessly") reallocate 
authority from the Executive to the Judicial branch. 
     B.   Congress has clearly mandated review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
          1.   The APA clearly governs by default. 
     Failure to review under the APA, absent contrary legislation, is at odds with a 
clear congressional desire to foster uniform treatment of citizens complaining of 
action by unelected federal officials. The 5th sentence of original APA section 12, 
Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 244 (1946), read: "No subsequent legislation shall 
be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent 
that it does so expressly." (Emphasis added.) This message is reinforced in 
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) (Appx. 
B). 
     "[N]o congressional legislation can bind subsequent sessions of 
the Congress. ... However, the act is intended to express general 
standards of wide applicability. it [sic] is believed that the courts 
should as a rule of construction interpret the act as applicable on a 
broad basis, unless some ubsequent act clearly provides to the 
contrary." Id. at 139.
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That the equivalent, § 559, was originally the final section of the APA, and the 
importance conveyed thereby, is unfortunately obscured by its now preceding, e.
g., judicial review, §§ 701 et seq. 
          2.   Further consideration of the PTO as an "agency". 
     The APA governs the PTO only if it is an "agency" as defined in § 551. As 
discussed, e.g., in Morgan v. Daniels, supra, this is not open to doubt. Were the 
situation otherwise, current statutory and non-statutory review under the APA 
might well be unwarranted. 
     Statutory review under 35 U.S.C.A. § 32 (Suspension or Exclusion From 
Practice) is conducted under the APA. Disciplinary action following a 
"formal" (trial-type) hearing is reviewed under the substantial evidence 
standard of § 706(2)(E). See, e.g., Klein v. Peterson, 696 F.Supp. 695 (D. D.C. 
1988), aff'd 866 F.2d 412 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. den. 490 U.S. 1091 (1989).[5] 
Denial of enrollment, likely to follow no oral hearing, much less a formal one,[6] 
is reviewed under the "arbitrary, capricious..." standard of § 706(2)(A); see e.
g., Premysler v. Lehman, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1859 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd 71 F.3d 387 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
     "Non-statutory" review[7] also appears to be governed by the APA; see, e.
g., Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F.Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991), cert. den. 502 U.S. 1075 (1992). It is, thus, difficult to understand 
why PTO patent [or trademark, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1071(a) (1963)] appeals would be 
accorded a different scope of review. 
          3.   Without legislative mandate, "clearly erroneous" review 
appears to be unique. 
     PTO patent appeals are governed by 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-44 (1984). No 
scope of review appears therein. While Congress recently specified "clearly 
erroneous" review for one agency, its use without expressed warrant seems 
unique in federal administrative practice; see, e.g., II Kenneth C. Davis & 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 11.3 (3d Ed. 1994). That 
scope of review also appears in a few state acts, but this, too, has been 
criticized; Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 648 (1991). Other authorities 
were also consulted; no further references to "clearly erroneous" in agency 
review have been found. Other considerations aside, does this marginalize the 
Office, and possibly the Court? 
          4.   Standards extrinsic to the APA have not been impliedly 
ratified. 
     No provision for statutory review of PTO actions explicitly sets forth the 
scope of review. As discussed above, failure to specify a scope of review does 
not justify use of a standard extrinsic to both the Patent Act and the APA. 
However, In re Lueders indicates the belief that the Court's use of a "clearly 
erroneous" standard has been impliedly ratified by Congress on several 
occasions, 111 F.3d 1569, 1575-77 (Fed. Cir. 1997), e.g., upon passage of the 
APA in 1946 and the Patent Act in 1952. Yet, recommendation XIII of an expert 
commission appointed by the Johnson Administration demonstrates that the 
standard fourteen years after the latest of these was not "clearly erroneous" as 
non-governmental patent experts understood it: 
     "A Patent Office decision refusing a claim shall be given a 
presumption of correctness, and shall not be reversed unless 
clearly erroneous." The President's Commission on the Patent 
System, "To Promote the Progress of... Useful Arts" In an Age of 
Exploding Technology 29 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
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     Given that Commission's perceptions in the mid-`60s, the earliest that 
Congress might have ratified the standard by inaction is 1982. Yet, the scope of 
review for PTO patent appeals does not appear to have been considered, then or 
earlier. Even if it had, § 559 is a major obstacle to amendment by implication. 
          5.   APA Standards have not been impliedly excluded. 
     Also as discussed in Lueders, 111 F.3d 1577 n. 12, 35 U.S.C.A. § 135 refers 
explicitly to review provisions of the APA. Hence, it is suggested that this 
impliedly indicates that Congress intended those provisions not otherwise to 
apply in PTO review. Not only is this proposition also at odds with the last 
section of the APA, but, again, were that so, the Court would be obligated to 
reconsider the authority of it and other courts to apply APA standards in, e.g., 
non-statutory PTO review. 
          6.   The Office is not estopped to insist on APA standards. 
     In the 1960s, the PTO was criticized for having standards "notoriously 
different" from the courts', e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 
(1966). However, as reflected in the recommendation of the Johnson 
Administration patent commission, discussed earlier, the CCPA thwarted its 
efforts to conform. See also, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and the 
Patent Office, the 3d chapter in The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies 
143 (1968). 
     Ironically, the same year that Graham was decided, the Supreme Court also 
established that the PTO could seek certiorari from adverse decisions of the 
CCPA, Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). While the Office prevailed on 
an issue of law in Manson, it did not seek, or at least did not secure, that result 
in any instance when it was reversed on its fact finding. 
     Yet, it is difficult to understand why this should estop subsequent 
administrations. Anything less deferential than APA review accords the Office 
less respect than that to which the Executive Branch is entitled. Anything more 
deferential accords the public less than it has a right to expect from the Judicial 
Branch. As pointed out in In re Donaldson Company, Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 
(Fed. Cir. 1994): "The fact that the PTO may have failed to adhere to a 
statutory mandate over an extended period of time does not justify its 
continuing to do so." 
     Last, it seems the standard of review did not need to be briefed until 1993. 
Thus, the PTO does not seem to have unduly delayed in pursuing the issue. 
III.   APA REVIEW REFLECTS SOUND POLICY 
     A.   It provides access to the mainstream of administrative process. 
     As much as possible, legal standards should directly reference the most 
relevant bodies of precedent. While, as discussed below, Rule 52(a) is superior 
to a sui generis "clearly erroneous" scope of review, the APA is even better. To 
the extent that it fosters uniformity among federal agencies, cases under the 
Act provide helpful guidelines for resolving not only novel fact-related issues, 
but also ones involving procedural and substantive rights -- likewise not 
explicitly addressed in §§ 141-44. 
     With regard to procedure, see, e.g., In re Pantzer, 341 F.2d 121 (CCPA 
1965); "The question presented is one of Patent Office practice, and this court 
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will not disturb the rulings of the Patent Office in the absence of a showing of 
clear error." Id. at 126. Although the meaning of "clear error" in this context is 
uncertain and obviously different from that in reviewing questions of fact, the 
approach is nevertheless consistent with the degree of deference called for in 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978): 
     "In short, nothing in the APA, NEPA, the circumstances of this 
case, the nature of the issues being considered, past agency 
practice, or the statutory mandate under which the Commission 
operates permitted the court to review and overturn the 
rulemaking proceeding on the basis of the procedural devices 
employed (or not employed) by the Commission so long as the 
Commission employed at least the statutory minima, a matter 
about which there is no doubt in this case." Id. at 548.
     With regard to substantive issues, see, e.g. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 
F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. den. subnom. Organon, Inc. v. Kessler and 
Bracco Diagnostics Inc. v. Kessler, 117 S.Ct. 788 (1997):[8] 
     "Commissioners Kessler and Lehman contend that `under the 
familiar instructions of the Supreme Court in Chevron... PTO's Final 
Determination is entitled to controlling weight.' The contention is 
unavailing, based as it is on a mistake as to Chevron's breadth. ... 
As the Seventh Circuit recently had occasion to note, however, 
`only statutory interpretations by agencies with rulemaking powers 
deserve substantial deference.'" Id. at 549.
     B.   APA review is not unduly deferential. 
     Adherence to congressionally-mandated standards of review for all PTO 
actions, unless a controlling statute otherwise provides, does not abdicate 
Federal Circuit responsibility as the primary judicial overseer of the patent 
system (or as a major overseer of the federal trademark registers). Besides 
being obligated to set aside "arbitrary, capricious..." action under § 706(2)(A) or 
"unsupported by substantial evidence..." under § 706(2)(E), paragraphs (B)-(D) 
of § 706(2) provide that "The reviewing court shall-... set aside agency action... 
found to be- ... contrary to constitutional right...; in excess of statutory... 
authority...; [or] without observance of procedure required by law...." 
     Also, while the APA does not explicitly require, e.g., findings and reasons for 
action taken other than after a trial-type hearing, courts have nevertheless 
refused to uphold agencies whose decisions lack reasoned support in the record 
compiled by the agency. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). Note, too, that Overton Park particularly 
eschews post hoc rationalizations; id. See also, I Davis & Pierce, § 8.5, at 392-
4. 
IV.   "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" ENCOURAGES APPEALS; "CAPRICIOUS, 
ARBITRARY..." AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY 
     A.   "Clearly erroneous" is an uncertain benchmark. 
     Terms that describe applicable standards of review have little meaning 
standing alone. Thus, it might be questioned whether the court is actually 
reviewing PTO decisions as aggressively as "clearly erroneous" suggests. That 
appears to be the case; see, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance and the 
Useful Arts, 50 Ohio St. L. J. 1415, 1439 (1995). However, reversal rates, per 
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se, are unhelpful. 
          1.   Reversal rates. 
     Thirty years ago, I had personal reason to consider how frequently patent 
examiners should be reversed by the Board and concluded that 50% would be 
optimal. A lower rate would indicate allowing too many claims of doubtful merit; 
a higher rate would mean unwarranted stinginess. This notion is reflected 
elsewhere; see, e.g., Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1980). Were it 
to capture the full picture, however, a reversal rate below 20% in PTO patent 
appeals would suggest that far too many invalid claims are allowed. See, e.g., 
Fred E. McKelvey, Appeals to the Federal Circuit from PTO, 1120 O.G. 22, Nov. 
30, 1990 (data on all appeals in which the Solicitor appeared during 1985-90).
[9] 
     It seems more likely that many appeals are pursued with small chance of 
success. This may well increase as the cost of refiling continues to increase. 
Also, reversal statistics for published decisions, alone, paint a daliesque picture. 
See, e.g., Erica U. Bodwell, Published and Unpublished Federal Circuit Patent 
Decisions: A Comparison, 30 Idea 233, 239-41 (1990). Moreover, as mentioned 
regarding the 1985 amendment to Rule 52(a), non-deferential standards of 
review may unduly encourage appeals. 
          2.   Early CCPA standards would have discouraged appeals. 
     Shortly before the APA was being considered, the CCPA afforded more 
deference than "clearly erroneous" review would allow:[10] 
"In cases involving intricate and highly technical questions, 
especially in the absence of the evidence of those expert in the art, 
concurring decision of the Patent Office tribunals will not be 
disturbed, unless it appear that they are manifestly wrong." In re 
Anhaltzer , 48 F.2d 657, 658 (CCPA 1931). (Emphasis added.)
     See also, e.g., In re Adamson, 92 F.2d 717 (CCPA 1937) using similar 
language. These are typical of most (80 of 135) pre-1944 cases found using 
West key 291k113(7) (Presumption as to correctness of decision below). These 
seem quite consistent with APA standards.[11] 
          3.   Moving to a less deferential standard. 
     Ranney v. Bridges, 188 F.2d 588 (CCPA 1951), is cited in Lueders, 111 F.3d 
1576 n. 10, for the proposition that "clearly erroneous" has long been the 
standard of review in PTO patent appeals. Yet, in Ranney, Judge Garrett did not 
use that term of art. How was one to determine that the CCPA intended to 
signal a marked departure from earlier decisions showing considerable 
deference to the PTO? How was one to determine that, e.g., the Rule 52(a) 
standard was then being adopted to govern PTO patent appeals? 
     Also, Lueders, 111 F.3d 1575 n. 8, quotes Morgan, "It is enough to say that 
the testimony as a whole is not of a character or sufficient to produce clear 
conviction that the Patent Office made a mistake." Yet, meaning of those words 
may have changed.[12] They also should be viewed in context; compare, e.g., 
the passage from Morgan above at II.A. 
     As discussed above, it appears that during at least one period a little over 30 
years ago, the CCPA standard of review in PTO patent appeals was externally 
perceived as very different. Indeed, "clearly erroneous" was suggested as more 
deferential than the scope of review then being used. Is the current standard a 
reaction to the proposal made to the Johnson Administration? 
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          4.   Uncertainty encourages appeals. 
     The current standard is uncertain. For example, does this Court contemplate 
application of a sui generis standard or that of Rule 52(a)? The latter is 
indicated in Lueders, 111 F.3d 1575, n. 8, but has that standard been embraced 
by the entire Court?[13] On rehearing, if "clearly erroneous" is not abandoned, 
this should be explicitly answered, preferably also with reference to the 1985 
amendment to that Rule. Also, unlike early CCPA decisions, more recent 
opinions of that and this Court do not give much attention to the technical 
nature of facts in dispute in patent appeals, a matter that, itself, deserves 
consideration and might furnish, e.g., a basis for distinguishing patent and 
trademark appeals. In any event, clear signals about likelihood of prevailing 
would seem to discourage "frivolous" appeals. 
B.   "Capricious, arbitrary...." is typically applied in these circumstances. 
     Absent contrary, explicit legislation, courts seem to have heretofore applied 
§ 706(2)(A) and (E) in very different circumstances. "Formal" or trial-type 
hearings are reviewed under the standard of paragraph (E). All else is reviewed 
with reference to the "arbitrary, capricious..." language of paragraph (A). As 
mentioned, this dichotomy has also been followed with regard to the PTO except 
where the Court has used "clearly erroneous" -- and possibly, as an exception to 
that exception, where statutory review is under 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 145-46 or 15 U.
S.C.A. § 1071(b); again, see Fregeau.[14] 
     What is to be made of the Administration's shifting position with regard to 
whether paragraphs (A) or (E) should apply? As discussed first in this argument, 
it may be semantic and not amount to much, if anything, in practice[15] -- 
certainly as between those standards, and any version of "clearly erroneous," 
little indeed. Yet, why should the Court abandon its current scope of review only 
to adopt another equally inconsistent with federal administrative practice? The 
"informal" PTO record furnishs no basis. 
     One facially reasonable basis for treating differently some facts determined 
by the PTO is furnished by the nature of patent law itself. As in Fregeau,[16] the 
Lueders panel, 111 F.3d 1577, n. 15, expressed concern about achieving parity 
in patent appeals that have different origins. That does not seem possible unless 
the Court is prepared to take the position that factual determinations affecting 
patent validity, insofar as they implicate a constitutional interest, are subject to 
more intense review than otherwise. In that vein, it would be useful for the 
Court to reflect on the implications of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union U.S., 466 
U.S. 485, 500 (1984), rehear. den. 467 U.S. 1267.[17] This could affect all 
direct and collateral review.[18] 
     In any event, such an approach would leave many issues, e.g., priority in 
patent interferences and all questions of fact in trademark appeals, to be 
addressed more conventionally on direct appeal. It is difficult to justify applying 
standards other than those of § 706(2)(A) in such instances. First, "substantial 
evidence" seems more apt to encourage appellants to rehash the record. 
Second, in contrast, "capricious, arbitrary" review should put the focus where it 
belongs: Did the Board adequately support what it did? If not, it should be 
reversed whether or not it might have supported its position. As reflected, e.g., 
in the first paragraph of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 
332 U.S. 194 (1947) (albeit applied to a legal issue), this approach is not novel. 
If nothing else, it can obligate, whenever needed, the PTO to get its house in 
order and its Boards, specifically, to address intramural appeals with the rigor to 
which applicants are entitled. Among other salutary effects, this should help to 
avoid the substantial expense of further appeal. 
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CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
     The Federal Circuit is respectfully urged to otherwise justify or to abandon a 
scope of review for PTO fact finding that appears to be and, by its ordinary 
meaning is, less deferential than warranted under the APA. 
     Alternatively, should the Court decide, notwithstanding arguments to the 
contrary, to stay its present course, it is respectfully urged to reference Rule 52
(a) explicitly and to attend as rigorously to external evolution of that rule in 
deciding patent appeals as it would in reviewing fact finding by federal district 
judges. 
NOTES
[1]     See, e.g., Pasquale J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Appeals, 22 J.P.O.S. 
838, 858-64 (1948) (in the 1850s, reviewing judges were both selected and 
paid by disgruntled patent applicants). 
[2]     Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Administrative Law: The American Public Law 
System, 742 (3d Ed. 1992). 
[3]      APA references are to 5 U.S.C.A. (1996) unless otherwise indicated. 
[4]     See also, Caspar W. Ooms, The United States Patent Office and The 
Administrative Procedure Act, 38 Trademark Rep. 149 (1948) (recounting how 
the PTO conformed to the newly enacted APA). 
[5]     See also, Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, rehear. den. 338 U.S. 939 
(1950). The case is also interesting in that Commissioner Kingsland successfully 
sought certiorari. 
[6]     See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224, 
239-40 (1973) (concerning the several meanings of "hearing"). 
[7]     This is, of course, a term of art. Truly non-statutory review does not 
exist. 
[8]     Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management 
Products Co., 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Kodak was not cited, although 
Judge Michel who wrote the decision was on the panel). See also, In re Van 
Ornum, 686 F.2d 937 (CCPA 1982) and Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. F.T.C., 
482 F.2d 672 passim (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. den. 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Compare 
Thomas G. Field, Jr., Commentary: Premysler v. Lehman, 36 Idea 341 (1996) 
(discussing instance where PTO has clear substantive authority). 
[9]     See also, Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976) and Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979). 
[10] Compare the headnote "Findings of experts of Patent Office on highly 
technical questions are given great weight and only rejected when clearly 
erroneous" (emphasis added). 
[11] Compare, e.g., Digital Equipment Corporation v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 
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726 (1st Cir. 1981) (addressing facts not within the PTO's special competence). 
[12]     As others, e.g., "science" as used in U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8. 
[13]     See also, e.g., Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (§ 145 review). Compare id., at 1042 (Newman, J. concurring in part). 
[14]     Supra note 13. See also, § 702(2)(F). 
[15]     But see III Pierce & Davis § 11.4. 
[16]     Supra note 13. 
[17]     See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Law and Fact in Patent Litigation, 27 Idea 153 
(1987) (raising the possible implications of the notion that "constitutional" facts 
might be reviewed less deferentially in the context of infringement litigation). 
[18]     See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 
799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986); compare Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo 
Electric U.S.A., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See also, Hyundai Electronics 
Industries Co., Ltd. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 899 F.2d 1204 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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